translation from English to Conflicts Forum.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is probably more interested in the Stati Uniti alla stabilità del Medio Oriente; dopotutto si tratta dell'area geografica cui appartiene. Per crescere e prosperare l'Iran ha bisogno di frontiere sicure e di vicini stabili. Un Afghanistan povero ed instabile, ad esempio, danneggia le vie commerciali e può far crescere il flusso dei profughi ed il narcotraffico nelle regioni nordorientali dell'Iran.
Ancora più fondamentale per l'Iran è la presenza di un Iraq stabile. La guerra tra Iran ed Iraq ha causato enormi sofferenze al popolo iraniano; gli iraniani non se ne dimenticheranno, almeno per i prossimi decenni. Non dimenticheranno neppure che le loro sofferenze furono in larga misura causate dal sostegno statunitense ed europeo a Saddam Hussein, compresa l'assistenza occidentale provided to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, which he regularly used against Iranians and against Iraqi civilians. These actions, barbarous and cruel, were never the object of condemnation from governments or the Western media. The Iranians believe that Western politicians are equally guilty of Saddam Hussein of these crimes against humanity. E 'imporant point out that Iran has never used or produced chemical weapons, either during or after hostilities, despite have adequate technological skills to do so. This, always specify the Iranians, in itself proof that the Islamic Republic of Iran is telling the truth when he says that is not his intention to develop nuclear weapons.
E 'is therefore understandable that the Iranians claim that they will not leave Iraq to be never used as a starting point for attack or to destabilize Iran. The Iranians will not allow their enemies, their opponents or their opponents in the years to come can benefit from Iraq to benefit in the event of a conflict of any kind with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
United States and Saudi Arabia persist in their attempts to increase sectarianism and racism, to divide Iran from neighboring countries. AlJazira I was in the television studios in Doha, Qatar where the U.S. ambassador to play the card of racism on live TV, and said that for centuries the Persians had represented something irrelevant to the rest of the region and at the same time constitute a continuing threat to it. In Iraq the majority of citizens has strong religious, historical and cultural links with Iran. Many Iraqi politicians and intellectuals have lived for many years in Iran, I know the Persian language, and perhaps have even married Iranian women during the difficult years in which only the Islamic Republic and Syria acknowledge and support the opposition to Saddam Hussein.
Moreover, while the Persian-language television channel funded and based in the West allow themselves to regularly go to criticism and derogatory statements against the Arabs, Iranians living in the Islamic Repbblica maintained una notevole empatia nei confronti degli iracheni che hanno sofferto sotto Saddam Hussein prima e sotto l'occupazione statunitense del loro paese poi. Gli iraniani continuano anche a sentirsi vicini agli arabi palestinesi, che pure sono a maggioranza sunniti, che soffrono l'occupazione di quello che in Iran viene considerato l'unico regime al mondo ufficialmente caratterizzato dallo apartheid.
L'Iran crede che un mutamento fondamentale nel quadro delle relazioni tra Iran ed Iraq sia già stato raggiunto, più che rappresentare una possibilità futura.
Questo non significa che gli iraniani desiderino che in Iraq si insedi un governo debole. L'enorme crescita del commercio, del turismo e degli investimenti tra i due paesi dopo la fall of Saddam Hussein represented an important stimulus for growth of the Iranian economy. At the border between Iran and Iraq, mostly deserted until 2003, now you can see long queues of trucks and buses waiting to cross the border. The border guards of both countries is engaged in the construction of infrastructure necessary to ensure that trade and investment can grow further, but still unable to meet the growing needs of pilgrims and businessmen. The Islamic Republic of Iran want then that Iraq is strong and stable, but also that it has good relations with Iran and with a commitment to uphold the interests of the peoples of the region as coplesso. Recent statements by the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who said that American troops must leave the country before the end of 2011, are a strong indication of what is happening.
The same reasoning is well suited to Afghanistan. The majority of Afghans to Iran shares religious and cultural ties, many in Afghanistan speak Persian. Despite what the Iranians believe represents a complete failure of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, Iran has invested heavily in the north, relatively more stable in costruzone of roads and infrastructure. Trade has grown significantly, and the moderate Sunnis and Shiites, backed by Iran and the United States permettevano di fatto ai talebani finanziati all'epoca dai sauditi -e dagli Emirati Arabi- di prendere il controllo del paese, sempre di più cercano l'appoggio iraniano perché gli abitanti del paese pensano che gli Stati Uniti abbiano perso la guerra e che prima o poi saranno inevitabilmente costretti ad abbandonare il paese.
Ho scritto che i talebani, all'epoca, erano finanziati dai sauditi, mentre avrei dovuto scrivere semplicemente che lo sono a tutt'oggi. Secondo documenti reperibili su Wikileaks, l'Arabia Saudita è a tutt'oggi il principale sostenitore dei talebani. In effetti quasi tutti i regimi arabi non democratici del Golfo Persico stanno ancora sostenendo economicamente i talebani. Dalle nostre parti, questo fatto viene considerato a kind of open secret. Moreover, these countries are not only financially supporting the Taliban, but they are providing support in all over the world to their ideology, which has strong affinities with that of AlQaeda. Many people wonder how they think the Americans who keep the alliance with Saudi Arabia could do in the long term interests of the United States. The spread of Salafi ideology in the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and elsewhere in Europe is really not related to the multibillion-dollar funding that they have been assigned, first of all with the Saudis?
Iranians feel that U.S. foreign policy makers, closing both eyes on the support provided by Saudis to more hardline Salafist groups operating around the world, are making things even more difficult. This error is in addition to the tragic state of affairs resulted from what the Iranians consider the insane invasion of Iraq, and the failure of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Added to this is also what Tehran sees as uncritical American support for the last state in the world that practices apartheid, imprisons that brutalizes and kills Palestinian women and children and young people guilty of some stone-throwing by keeping prisoners in conditions similar to those concentration camps. All this means that U.S. policies currently pursued in the Middle East is proving to be the long unsustainable. And this is especially true as the emerging strategic and economic power to rival the United States, such as the BRIC countries (China, India, Brazil, Russia) get benefits of each type in the same contexts in which the U.S. is still rather to suffer.
addition, ua general trend is emerging whereby the Shiite and Sunni organizations are kept under pressure throughout the Middle East, the allies of the despotic regimes the United States are trying in this way to ensure survival. In this state of affairs hostility toward the United States does nothing but grow and, ironically, extremist ideologies flourish financed by the Saudis. For now, this "investment" has enabled the Saudi royal family to buy peace for itself, but not for most of the rest of the world, including the United States. Of course, if governments supported by the United States will be able to survive or not is another matter. If local governments were to collapse, what will the people of those countries with oppressive policies implemented by the U.S. so far?
The allies have chosen as the despots that Arabs are those of Saudi Arabia, a country where women can not drive a car and for the most part not even have a bank account or those of Egypt and Jordan-may be a harbinger of grave consequences for the United States in the near future. The irony inherent in this is no exception to the Iranians, who live in a country where women represent 63% of the university student population. Most of my graduate students are women, and a woman is also the Dean of the Faculty of Tehran University where I teach.
The Iranians have also noticed how the U.S. reacted to the sham elections held in Egypt, continued to accuse Iran of not being democratic despite all the Iranian leaders are chosen directly by the people or bodies subject to public election . In the case of the 2009 presidential election there is no doubt that Ahmadinejad has won the con una valanga di voti; le prove definitive di questa vittoria sono state pubblicate in lingua inglese da studosi, accademici e sondaggisti. Se teniamo presente questo dato di fatto, agli occhi della maggior parte degli iraniani gli Stati Uniyti hanno di fatto sostenuto ed auspicato le sommosse per le strade di Tehran.
Gli Stati Uniti hanno accusato il governo iraniano di aver truccato le elezioni, senza fornire alcuna prova credibile a sostegno di questa loro affermazione. Le istanze degli Stati Uniti si basano sulla recezione acritica di asserzioni fatte da ben finanziati e sedicenti "esperti" della realtà iraniana che vivono negli Stati Uniti, che conoscono poco il paese e che per la maggior parte ostentano una profonda ed immotivata ostilità nei against the Islamic Republic. These people let it go to statements and forecasts about the fate of Iran for years, a brief review of what they produce in the recent past shows that have little arrows to their bow. As they say what the U.S. politicians want to hear from them, despite their errors of assessment and the lack of credibility of their analysis flawed continue to receive generous funding. It 's interesting to note that those among them that know the Persian language and tone they use very different language register according to speak in the channels being broadcast, government-owned or funded by the West, or think tank or U.S. television channels. Il motivo fondamentale per cui lo fanno è che non vogliono che le loro parole sembrino assurde al pubblico iraniano.
Quanti tra costoro si azzardino a riferire ad un pubblico occidentale qualcosa di diverso e di più ragionevole vengono rabbiosamente attaccati dai mass media statunitensi e dai cosiddetti "esperti di Iran", che continuano a vivere nel loro mondo di pura fantasia. Nonostante le minacce, le accuse e le calunnie, questi commentatori hanno continuato a dire la verità agli americani e agli europei, perché i governi occidentali evitassero di cadere in errori di calcolo dalle conseguenze controproducenti o addirittura drammatiche. Ma lo hanno fatto pagando un alto prezzo personale.
Certamente, dopo le proteste di massa against Mousavi, no specific precedents, which were held across the country after the riots of December 2009 Ashura, some people in the West have finally begun to open their eyes to reality. E 'arrivatro then on 11 February 2010, the anniversary of the victory of Islamic Revolution, for that day, the Western media had focused all hopes on events staged by the so-called green movement. Supporters of the green movement had argued that would bring millions of people flooded the streets of Tehran and crazy of Liberty on live TV. In fact, when millions of people really took to the streets of Tehran (and similar events were held around the same time country) supporters Mousavi there was no sign anywhere. Western analysts have begun to admit, albeit reluctantly, the possibility of having misinterpreted the events.
Ironically, in the long-term events of the last year have made the Iranian people more united than ever, not seen since the early days of the Revolution. Many critics and many opponents of President Ahmadinejad felt outraged by the behavior of mice after the elections, especially after he failed to produce any convincing evidence of electoral fraud and in fact had aligned their positions in those organizations based in and financed by the West, among which there are also organizations ruthless terrorist Mujahedin of how those people who have served for more than two decades Saddam Hussein as mercenaries, the supporters of the former Shah of base in the United States, the perpetrators of violent street clashes that have killed, mutilated and humiliated officials Police and military in terms of public policy on the streets of Tehran. That is why, on the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, the size and emotional participation in the demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic held throughout the country were unprecedented.
Contrary to popular belief currently in the West, most of the mainstream among the reformers did not approve the conduct of Musavi, from the beginning essa ha riconosciuto il risultato elettorale. I parlamentari riformisti che conosco, e che rispetto, lo hanno più volte ripetuto sia in pubblico che in privato. Il leader della corrente riformista del parlamento, il signor Tabesh, si è più volte pronunciato in merito in svariate occasioni. Altri parlamentari riformisti come i dottori Kavakebian, Khabbaz e Pazeshkian, così come altri riformisti come il professor Aref, hanno aderito a questo punto di vista, nonostante la loro forte opposizione al Presidente Ahmadinejad.
Nonostante tutto questo, i politici occidentali ed i mass media occidentali hanno a grande maggioranza capito solo quello che volevano capire, o che gli serviva capire.
Questo non significa negare la brutalità the police or some government personalities have not dealt poorly with the emergency. The fact remains that a solid majority of Iranian citizens bore the bulk of the blame has to Mousavi, as it has led to the allegations and no evidence that has moved.
The U.S. reaction to the elections was, as I just explained, heavily conditioned by their dependence on "issues of Iranian experts" who spread misinformation, or in bad faith and has led to significant falls possbilità for any form of rapprochement between the significant two countries, at least for the foreseeable future. Not that the chances were still many, as revealed by Wikileaks documents the Iranians suspected had the foundation and the good intentions of Obama about his interest in reviewing the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran were not really fair, since their draft. The dispatches collected by Wikileaks also reveal the extent to which the United States have distorted information about the country's internal affairs. The U.S. embassies in the countries bordering with Iran, as well as most Western embassies in Tehran, Iran from receiving information that they share the political line or by others who refer to their correspondents what they want to hear, for reasons practical. This is reflected in events like the signing of documents by Obama in support of the Turkish and Brazilian diplomacy, e poi nel suo incredibile voltafaccia avvenuto immediatamente dopo la firma della Dichiarazione di Tehran.
Non è una novità, questa dei calcoli sbagliati in merito all'Iran, né episodi simili si limitano alle tornate elettorali. L'intera politica statunitense sul programma nucleare iraniano è basata su quello che agli occhi degli iraniani viene a maggioranza considerato un grossolano errore di calcolo. Il programma nucleare non è soltanto consideato dalla popolazione come qualcosa che attiene alla sovranità nazionale dell'Iran. Costituisce anche un investimento multimiliardario in dollari, che coinvolge decine di migliaia di iraniani, qualcosa che è nato svariati decenni fa. Di conseguenza si tratta di un qualcosa che ha il support of almost all citizens. One of the reasons why Ahmadinejad has won two presidential terms is that in the eyes of the majority showed no willingness to please the Western powers on the nuclear issue. Nuclear power has been instrumental in weakening the image of President Khatami, often considered to be submissive in front of Western pressure.
The wishful thinking that some Western countries show off on the conditions of the Iranian economy and its collapse is always considered as imminent and remains wishful thinking. In recent weeks the so-called "Iranian experts of things" and the Western media have reiterated that Iran's program of reform of public subsidies is sign that the sanctions are effective. Although this shows a profound misunderstanding of what is the reality of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranians know that, contrary to what the claims of European and U.S. secretaries of state, the sanctions were imposed for hurting the Iranian people. The imposition of sanctions has not done anything but raise the anger and hostility toward the United States.
addition, the program of reform of subsidies, so far, the most ambitious economic reform program ever implemented in the contemporary history of Iran, is actually a sign that the incumbent government is strong and confident in their strength. The program has been discussed for years, but governments have not found the courage to do it. After careful planning, the current administration has decided to adopt it. Do not you notice signs of mistrust and many Iranians believe that the reforms will lead in future to develop a stronger economy. Those who criticize the government, which are guidance or principistico reformist, also support for most of the program. And 'is significant that the Iranian currency and gold reserves in this period have reached their absolute maximum.
This does not mean that Iran is seeking a way out of the impasse over the nuclear issue, but there is no doubt that there are any sviluppi positivi devono essere i paesi occidentali a muovere per primi e a riconoscere all'Iran il diritto di arricchire l'uranio per scopi pacifici. Al contrario di quanto si va dicendo in Occidente, l'orientamento della comunità internazionale è proprio questo, perché gli stati membri del movimento dei paesi non allineati, così come quelli che appartengono all'Organizazione della Conferenza Islamica, sostengono ufficialmente il punto di vista iraniano.
L'Iran, per circa due anni, ha fatto ben più che fermare il proprio arricchimento dell'uranio; ha fermato realmente e pressoché per intero il proprio programma nucleare ed ha adottato il Protocollo Addizionale. Ha permesso che la IAEA portasse a termine ispezioni intromissorie, many of which had nothing to do with its nuclear program and seemed more intelligence operations on behalf of the U.S. government. The fact that the IAEA, an organism widely influenced by the West as undemocratic, has not found any evidence or other showing that the Iranian nuclear program had never had any purpose other than peaceful and nevertheless continues to oppose the nuclear program, is a 'another reason why the Iranians are placing little confidence in Western governments. The U.S. relations with the Israeli regime, with India and Pakistan, which are all countries with nuclear weapons, are relatively narrow, in the case of Pakistan, for example, the existence of a central government weak army has cast doubt on the ability to prevent these weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban or allied groups.
American politicians are deceiving themselves if they think the dispatches can be found on Wikileaks mentioning the hostility of a number of Arab policy towards Iran and its nuclear program is really showing a stronger U.S. attitude towards Iran. These documents have the opposite effect if anything, to weaken these already unpopular despots before the eyes of their own countrymen. The fact is clear if you look at the Arab Public Opinion Poll of 2010, which shows that a large majority of Arabs are in favor of the Iranian nuclear program. The investigation reveals also that while 88% of the Arabs consider the Israeli regime as a threat and 77% think the same of the United States, Iran is considered that only 10% (as a measure of comparison can be considered the fact that another 10% consider threatening Algeria).
Another big mistake is to think of Western experts that support from Iran to Palestine and Lebanon, the Palestinians in particular, has a utilitarian character. If you go to resume the political positions of the current pre-revolutionary Iran's rulers, it is noted that the Palestinian issue had a key role in the policy of opposition to the Shah. One of the many mistakes of the so-called green movement was having mal valutato la profonda empatia diffusa in Iran nei confronti del popolo palestinese durante i disordini verificatisi a Tehran lo scorso anno, durante l'ultimo venerdi del mese di Ramadan. Il fatto che nello stesso periodo scienziati ed ex membri del governo siano stati rapiti ed uccisi da agenti israeliani non ha fatto altro che accrescere la rabbia popolare.
Il sostegno iraniano alla Palestina, al Libano e ai movimenti della Resistenza antisionista non accenna a calare ed ogni aspettativa occidentale secondo la quale se si verificano certe circostanze l'Iran cambierà politica è priva di fondamento. La linea politica ufficiale che l'Iran ha sempre seguito è quella di non riconoscere comunque Israele, perché si tratta di uno stato fondato su an apartheid like that in place at the time the Republic of South Africa, but also to respect any decision in that regard will be taken by the Palestinians. According to the Iranian point of view, any decision must involve all Palestinians, both those who live in Palestine and those who live outside of it, which means that the decision should involve the millions of people living in camps refugees. In Lebanon, the Islamic Republic of Iran supports the independence and sovereignty of the country and think that Lebanon and Lebanese civilians can be protected only through the Resistance Israeli aggression in southern Lebanon. For this reason, the Islamic Republic of Iran will support Hezbollah at any cost.
In Tehran there is a widespread belief that strong regional balances are changing significantly in favor of Hezbollah, the Palestinians and the Zionist resistance. The rise of an independent Turkey, whose government has a global vision very different from that of the U.S. Government, German, English and French, together with its regional decline of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are signs of a big change in the geopolitical balance in the region. The inability to come to Saudi military chief of the Yemeni tribes in the border clashes, the general decline of the Egyptian regime in all its aspects, and the almost universal disdain that characterizes politicians in both countries and other regimes and their elites filooccidentali corrrotte throughout the Arab world are considered signs of an imminent radical change of the balance. the fact that the Iranian president and the prime minister turkish enjoy wide popularity in Arab countries, while most Arab leaders are cordially detested, is another sign that the region is changing.
Some people think that because the so-called "axis of moderation" is declining, along with the declining fortunes of the United States, Washington might be tempted to undertake a limited military confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran before the presidential election of 2012. The Iranians believe that this possibility is very unlikely. But they also believe that the stability or instability in the area between the Mediterranean and India is inextricably linked to peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region. A glance at a map makes it clear that Iran is able to handle threats in the region and even beyond the boundaries. If there is no security for the Iranians, they think, will not secure any of their antagonists in the region. Under these conditions the United States may well expect that oil and gas no longer be exported from the Persian Gulf, Iraq and North or Central Asia. Iran is becoming more familiar with the recurring threats U.S. Army. There is also a growing belief that Western governments have internalized the fact that Iran is able to protect its citizens. Western governments must recognize the fact that Iran seeks peace, but is not intimidated by threats of war, such threats are Western governments seem cruel and uncivilized. The resounding defeat suffered by the Israeli regime by the much smaller and much worse equipped resistance movement in southern Lebanon, Tehran is remembered with pride.
Iran has put into account can go forward without diplomatic relations with the United States in coming years, and a growing number of young Iranian men and of operator stress are looking to Asian countries like China and India, Brazil and South Africa for their higher studies for their business and their business ventures. But these are the same people who still wonder if indeed there is a potential partner in the United States, someone who can reshape U.S. foreign policy and lead to real change in relations between Iran and the United States.
Sayyed Mohamed Marandi is an associate professor of English literature at Tehran University. It 'also a columnist for various broadcasts news and current affairs.
