Mercato e tariffe dell'acqua in Iran
Kazem Sadr
Il mercato ha avuto un ruolo importante nella fornitura e nella distribuzione dell'acqua fin dal sorgere di uno stato islamico in Arabia ed ha continuato a svolgere questa funzione nel corso dello sviluppo dell'economia dei paesi islamici. In questo articolo si tratta dell'esperienza Iran regarding the organization and conduct of the water market and describes the innovations that have led to alternative forms of exchange and pricing before and after the Islamic revolution.
I am grateful to my colleague, Mr. A. Isfandiari Noori, who encouraged me to write this essay. The ideas and information he provided through here often, but are personally liable for any errors. I am also grateful to Dr. H. Ghanbari who has devoted much time to control and correction of this article, and the Development Research Centre (IDRC) for giving me the opportunity to participate in the Workshop on water management in the Islamic world.
Proprietà delle risorse idriche e diritti di utilizzo
I diritti di proprietà delle risorse idriche sono oggetto di trattazione della giurisprudenza islamica, o più precisamente nel fiqh , insieme con i diritti di proprietà sulle risorse del sottosuolo. Questi ultimi sono distinti a seconda che riguardino miniere poco profonde o "aperte" o miniere di profondità o "interne". Le risorse idriche sono generalmente considerate come appartenenti al primo gruppo, e vengono trattate nelle discussioni che lo riguardano. I fuqaha (i giuristi musulmani) generalmente concordano sul fatto che sia le acque di superficie che le sorgenti sotterranee sono una risorsa common property (Ibn Barraj AH 1410, 6:257-58) or something which is part of the 'Anfal , or to what belongs to Imam, the just and rightful owner, which can be exploited directly by the government or assigned lease to private parties (Kolaini AH 1388, 1:538).
Any investment made by any holder of the share rights to access to the sources, gives the person who does the private ownership of water, or a priority right to use water obtained in this way, but nor does it confer any rights on the river or the basin where the water comes from. The wells, qanat -series of wells connected to the bottom culverts with a slight incline, where the water flows by gravity, or channels, which are alternative forms of investment to gain access to water, are owned by the investor, which also includes the water that is pumped or channeled through them. However, the source of water as such remains the property of the municipality.
While no one can "own" the source itself, in some cases, depending on the characteristics of the source, you can get the exclusive rights of water use or withdrawal. The number of cases where this is possible are the subject of discussion below.
rights on water sources
First, seas, lakes and large rivers under Islamic law are res Communitatis on which no one can claim exclusive right of possession. The contents of Toosi (nd, 3:282) in this regard has the general consensus of fuqaha . Both the Iranian Civil Code (Article 155) that the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Article 45) are the same positions. In any case, the availability of water from sources such as these usually exceeds the demand, so you do not even ask questions about the priority or exclusive right of exploitation. All have the same right to tap into it.
Still, if the water flows naturally from springs or flowing in channels and no one had to work or invest, it is equally common property. The flow of water from these sources can drastically decrease as a result of the request, with the increase of population or economic growth. In these cases must be defined a criterion of distribution. Some fuqaha thought to be based on the principle of "first come, first served basis. The rights of way for the use of running water are assigned in order of precedence, the pelvis or the surface or underground spring remain in every case of joint ownership.
The legal basis for this "rule of the above" is represented by a hadith establishing those that precede the use of someone else's property is the first to have rights on it (Beihaqi nd, 6:142, 1408 AH Noori, 4:6). This right of way does not allow in any case to anyone who has to steal more than they need, primarily because the ownership of the property remains common, and secondly because this principle should not be construed to deny rights others. E 'Needless to say, the privileges associated with previously not constitute a precedent on which to raise claims of ownership.
If the water that comes from a common property resource is not sufficient to meet the legitimate demands of those who are eligible, how it should be proceed to distribute among those requesting them? Some fuqaha have suggested the use of the draw. Others think of an order of priority based on the distance from the source, so that the farms are irrigated, one after the other until the last drop does not reach as far. Najafi (1392 AH, 38:110) prefers this second criterion, which is also entitled to a hadith and that was followed in many Muslim countries. The Iranian Civil Code (Article 156) clearly states that if a watercourse is not sufficient to irrigate all the land along and between their owners a dispute arises between them and no one can claim legitimate rights of way, as close to precede the more distant, and irrigate using the amount of water that is strictly necessary.
In cases where access to a common pool is obtained by digging a well or a channel, those who have invested has the right to property on the water drawn. According to Najafi, where the water is common property regimented (in a basin or in a channel), it becomes private property of haez , ie one who is employed to contain it, provided that its actions do not is derived harm to others. Najafi (1392 AH, 38:116) states that such cases are there differences of opinion between different fuqaha . Toosi (nd, 3:282) states that if someone steals water so contained is obliged to return it to its rightful owner. Articles 149 and 150 of Iranian Civil Code recognize that right.
If someone digs a well in their field or in a dry land, in order to draw water, most of fuqaha believes that he has become owner of the well water (AH Najafi 1392, 38: 116). Toosi (nd, 3:282) argues that it rests only allowed to use water and not to sell that which exceeds its needs. The opinion is based on a few of Toosi hadith reported by Ibn Abbas, Abu Jaber and Horairah, which relate to judgments Envoy (Peace be upon him) which shows that the sale of excess water is unacceptable (Beihaqi nd, 6:151). According to the most fuqaha , these anecdotes can not limit the right to free trade. The latter use is not only general and freely practiced, but there are legal traditions that explicitly allows for the trading of excess water. The judgments of the Call (peace be upon him) are interpreted as meaning that selling the water that exceed their needs in cases where no one has yet resulted from haez not afford to, or that such a transaction Business is not recommended in any case.
Imam Sadegh and Imam Jafar Ibn Mossa approve the sale, whether for cash or in exchange for grain, the share of a qanat held by someone (Al-Hurr-Amiliyy to 1403 AH, 277-78, 332).
Most fuqaha agree that if anyone can rightfully take the flow of water channeled or pumped from a source of common property, may freely sell this property, all or in part. The same right is legitimized by Article 152 of Iran's civil code.
The government and regulation of rights on water resources
Water resources are owned common people and not a government estate. All have an equal right to draw, and this private activity is protected and can not be subject to interruptions until it affects the rights of others. The exercise of this right, however, can lead to overuse, and groundwater reserves are particularly susceptible to exhaustion, due to excessive pumping. In these cases, the principle of "not infringe the rights of others" and "not abuse" go forward to what establishes the freedom of these operations. Government authorities at local or national, then proceed on the basis of previously established rules to protect the public interest. In the next section
we will consider other rules that safeguard the same principles.
sometimes happens that governments need to resolve conflicts that may arise between users which compete for water common property. For example, construction of dams along the rivers increases the availability of drinking water and irrigation, and agriculture is expanding rapidly and growing population, or can diminish the water available for both fields usage, resulting in lack access to water a group that would rather just entitled to it, thus calling into question the principle that the exercise of freedom should not infringe the rights of others. The government può in questi casi interferire per determinare le priorità nell'utilizzo: provvedendo a compensare quanti avrebbero da rimetterci, il governo può risolvere il problema.
Il governo ed il mercato delle risorse idriche
Alle origini dello stato islamico
Una delle caratteristiche di un sistema economico islamico è che le attività economiche non sono delegate per intero né alle organizzazioni mercantili, né ad eventuali uffici pubblici di pianificazione. Dell'economia si occupano organizzazioni di entrambi i generi e ciascuna di essere svolge i propri compiti di fornitura, disposizione and distribution. In fact, the time has passed (peace be upon him) and his successors the two major economic institutions were the market, which supplied and distributed private goods including water, and the public treasury, or baitulmal , who was responsible for economic planning, planning and financial resources necessary for infrastructure investment, including construction of dams.
early Islamic era, in each market took part in many subjects whose behavior was controlled by the inspectors (Sadr, 1996).
Sellers and buyers could enter or exit from any market to choose the best company based on information available to their disposal. The government's right to interfere in the market to set prices was limited. Based on these primary uses has reached an agreement rather than general-although not universal, among the lawyer-argument that if the market performs well, nobody is allowed to catch them by fixing prices. Otherwise, governments have the right to do so if prices fluctuate in market control and if you can not restore a balance in another way (Rajaee 1996, 57-98).
of the criteria for setting prices, most fuqaha insists on the concept of "fair price" means a price which will be determined by the market if they apply the laws of sharia and if the market is in normal condition (Khomeini 1989, 4:318-19). If these conditions are not, the price is set equal to the price that would prevail in conditions where the demand for a product available for your bid. Islamic jurisprudential literature in this policy is usually described as "like value" (Toosi 1404 AH, 4:23). In the first
Islam is also setting examples for the prevention and waste dell'accaparramento of goods or resources, and against the imposition of external costs in respect of traders in the vicinity, which combined with the full observance of Islamic laws contracts helped to make the market from working efficiently. The absence quotas, duties or tariffs further facilitated trade. In this way the prices were market-determined prices were efficient, that you could not find, let alone impose a different price they are able to further increase customer satisfaction or profit of the sellers (Sadr 1996, 188).
The birth of the water market
In many regions of the world such as Africa and Asia, water has been reason for human settlements and the development of civilization (Issawi 1971, 213 ).
populations have settled around rivers and springs for living conditions in dry climates. At the beginning development of these communities, the availability of water usually exceeded the demand. At later stages of growth, due to increased population, income and the proliferation of varied economic activities, the demand for water grows and eventually exceed the availability, so water is usually rationed by the laws of the community and tariffs. Since the methods of rationing are suggested by those belonging to the community, they are consistent and correspond to the rules and rights are accepted by the community and lead to legitimize the use of facilities for water supply.
With the passing of time, in human societies, expanding quando la richiesta di acqua supera la disponibilità vengono create nuove istituzioni mercantili, perché l'insieme di regole e tradizioni esistenti non riesce a garantire una collocazione efficiente delle risorse. In mercati dell'acqua tanto segmentati, la cui misura dipende dalla disponibilità della materia prima, il mezzo di scambio più affidabile ed accessibile è dato dall'acqua stessa, perché può essere utilizzata per produrre qualunque cosa sia coltivabile. In alcune regioni del Medio Oriente, per esempio in Iran dove l'ottanta per cento della terra coltivata viene adibita a frumento ed orzo, è naturale che proprio orzo e frumento abbiano servito come moneta di scambio nel mercato dell'acqua.
Questo fenomeno, ovvero transactions in kind instead of cash, may be the cause of the sensation that the water has never been a marketable commodity, and that was never bought or sold on the market. As we have explained, the legislation and case law recognize the existence of Islamic institutions to the commercial water trade cases reported by Safinejad (1985, 1996) and other anthropologists are the proof. In their accounts of the traded commodity is represented by food, food or water as they are, and in some cases by money.
water for private use, water for public use
The market is not the only institution that controlla l'offerta e la domanda di beni e di servizi all'interno di una comunità. Molte imprese pubbliche ed organizzazioni costituite da gruppi di individui esistono per assolvere alla stessa funzione.
Buchanan (1968) riuscì a prevedere che le organizzazioni che forniscono o collocano beni pubblici e privati potessero variare secondo criteri continui. La sua analisi si basa sull'assunto che il principio chiave della decisione sia il costo esterno che fornire certi beni comporta (Buchanan and Tullock 1971). La sua teoria prevede la formazione di mercati per beni privati, di gruppi o di organizzazioni collettive per i beni pubblici, e la predominanza del governo per i beni di natura esclusivamente pubblica (Buchanan 1968).
In molti contesti sociali le sue previsioni si sono dimostrate corrette, tranne che nei paesi musulmani, dove l'acqua è un bene con il quale hanno a che fare organizzazioni di tutti e tre i tipi, perché può essere considerata un bene privato in alcuni contesti ed un bene pubblico in altri.
Il monopolio e la supervisione governativa
In molte economie il mercato del gas, dell'acqua, dell'elettricità e dei servizi telefonici tende naturalmente verso una struttura monopolistica. La quota di investimenti iniziali necessari a fornire questi servizi è alta, mentre è bassa quella dei costi variabili.
Questo fa sì che i costi variabili e marginali che servono per estendere i services or using them to reach a new customer are very low, no other vendor can compete with what is already on the market. This monopoly situation and the high cost that they blame the economic behavior of arbitration to consumers means that suppliers adopt policies of differing prices. In other words, water is sold at different prices to consumers in the city, industrialists and farmers.
Another type of discrimination practiced is to reduce the prices with the increase of the quantity purchased, to encourage customers to purchase larger quantities. Recently, after realizing that the demand for water fluctuates, many vendors have begun to follow an increasing block pricing scheme: the water has low prices up to a certain amount consumed, and the price goes up to exceed certain thresholds and higher consumption (Sadr 1996). The result is that water suppliers are able each time to practice perfect price discrimination by mixing the two techniques.
The spread of these behaviors has led governments to monitor performance and pricing strategies of public services.
The establishment of water charges in Iran
In Iran, the most important rivers flowing mostly through areas mountain which is used to irrigate mostly to surface waters. The rest of the country depends on underground water, drawn through qanat .
Surface waters
The rivers are used by farmers based on their proximity (art. 156, Civil Code). As reported by Lampton (1969) Toroq village, near Mashhad in northeastern Iran, receives irrigation water that arise after the villages closest to the river that runs through the area. The same situation arises in Kurdistan, where the villages are close to the rivers they use as much water as needed, while the remainder is allocated to centers away. In any case, no one can build a dam or channel the flow of current in the fields through which the water flows.
During the summer flow of many rivers decreases, so that the villages that hold water rights are also preserved precedence for its use. Lampton report saying that the river water Zayanderood is distributed in a manner determined in time savafide. from November 15 to June 5, you can draw water without limits. In the summer the water is reserved for well-defined areas and villages. The water that comes from the river Jadjrood is also distributed as determined by an ancient tradition in some counties tap for free, other devono pagarla.
Fin dal 1943 la fornitura ed il controllo delle acque di superficie sono ufficialmente compito di un'agenzia governativa per le acque (Ministero dell'Energia, 1994, 16-21). Negli anni successivi sono state aperte anche organizzazioni regionali incaricate di controllare il funzionamento delle dighe esistenti in ogni regione e la distribuzione dell'acqua presso i villaggi.
Nel 1968, dopo l'entrata in vigore della legge sulla nazionalizzazione delle acque, le agenzie regionali ebbero anche il compito di imporre dei costi sull'acqua distribuita, quel tanto che bastava per coprire le spese. Le spese comprendevano anche i costi, variabili, delle operazioni di manutenzione ed i costi fissi del deprezzamento e degli interessi (Ministero Energy, 1994, 392).
In 1982 the law was revised, extended and approved by parliament under the name of law for the equitable distribution of water . The irrigation water should have a price determined by the average variable cost and the depreciation, as before, the interests are no longer part of his calculation. In areas where it is difficult to quantify, the water may have a price which depends on the size of the plots to be irrigated and the type of cultivation (Ministry of Energy, 1994, 234-40). According to the procedure approved by the Ministry of Energy, Water for agricultural use since 1990 has an estimated cost in this way.
- The average price of water drawn from "networks modern, "or from the main or secondary channel of the dams, is equal to three percent of the proceeds from the crops planted, the average cost of water drawn from traditional channels is equal to one percent, the water obtained from a combination of the two networks, at a cost equal to two percent.
- The average yield of crops in each region occurs through the statistics released by the Ministry of Agriculture. The value of each crop is measured by both its price, it was an agreed, or the price to the producer. With this information the agencies determine the cost of water per cubic meter of water (Ministry of Energy, 1994, 295-296).
In 1990 companies were established for the municipal water and sewage after the approval of their bill by the parliament. According to the proposal that the private sector, banks and municipalities may participate in the expenditure necessary for the implementation of these systems and their control, to be exercised by the company according to commercial law.
This law, which places no doubt the legal basis for private sector participation in the affairs that concern the use of water in urban environments, is also a sign of a change in general policy. The price to pay for water and sewer services will be calculated and proposed by the management boards of companies from the operating costs and depreciation and will enter into force after having been approved by the Economic Commission of the Government.
The water consumption of less than five cubic meters per month is exempt from any rate, because low-income families have access to water for drinking, washing and for the religious needs. The higher consumption costs are calculated according to the method of mounting blocks: the criteria in force in 1995 for the province of Tehran are shown in Table 1. In the other provinces is calculated similarly. In 1996 the rates have increased. The monthly consumption of up to five cubic meters are free of charge, while up to twenty-five cubic meters have been the tariff of 1995. In contrast, the block between twenty five and forty-five cubic meters has suffered a rising twenty-five per cent, and that over a forty-six cubic meters of thirty. In 1998 they were set for commercial and industrial water use, higher fares for domestic use, according to a pricing policy opposed to the hitherto practiced.
Groundwater
qanat I have always been the main technology for the removal of water from underground reserves, although in recent times have started to be replaced from wells equipped with pumps. It 's normal, then, that the rights in the arid regions of Iran water use, the types of transactions and how to determine prices have in some way to deal with qanat .
The following concerns the water markets that rely on sampling practices made possible by this technology. The water in each
qanat is initially divided between those who share the quota system. Wherever the technology is used qanat was therefore used to observe the shifts, which are naturally shorter in spring and summer than in other seasons, because the evaporation and water consumption by crops are higher. Divide the water of qanat between one or more villages rather far apart (Yazdani, 1985) has prompted the formation, over time, technicians trained in both the maintenance of the systems that deploy without wasting water between farmers. Thus was born a labor market for two distinct professionalism.
The first type is highly technical and requires expertise in construction and dredging qanat .
For the second one is the necessary talent to take the distribution patterns that minimize waste.
Who takes care of distribution must also be trusted by all concerned, since it has the power to manipulate the entitlement of everyone. The importance of this work has so that should take care to choose those who have been adopted alternative forms of group decision. In every case, with holders of water rights that put together a team of workers to irrigation, which in turn appoint a kind of distributor head. Rights holders must then approve the choice by a majority vote (Safinejad, 1985).
Table 1. The blocks of charging for the province of Tehran in 1994. Rates are in rials per cubic meter, the blocks of consumption in cubic meters.
50-10 11-15 16-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 70 +
15 25 30 36 67 100 133 168 300
Source: Ministry of Energy, Department for urban water and sewage.
In 1997 the exchange rate was one U.S. dollar for four rials.
usually those involved in dredging is paid in kind, in most cases with a share of the water.
In a village of Gonabad, in the Northeast, each field is irrigated every fourteen days in the summer and every twenty-one in the other seasons. The payment is made for those who dredge adding a dimension, ie one day before a field is irrigated and assigning a person who does the maintenance this extra day. In another village, also in Gonabad, you increase the interval between two rounds of sixteen to seventeen days, while Ghaylen it passes from seventeen to eighteen, even in these cases, the extra day needed to pay those who perform maintenance work ( Yazdani, 1985). In a village in the province of Yazd, central Iran, the group was involved in the distribution consists of four persons who received pay equal to eighteen hours and a half of water, which they could use for their fields or sell (Safinejad, 1996 ). In the village of
Tafresh once happened that a qanat was severely damaged by a large full and that the repair turns out to be very costly for the poor farmers who possessed it. The owner of the funds offered them a deal he thought would cost to rebuild the plant in return for one more day, at every turn, where the water would have befallen him, or, in exchange for an increase the rotation period of eight to nine days (Safinejad, 1985).
Over time pay in cash has become customary, as with the payment in kind. In a village of Ferduos, as in other parts of the country, water is distributed by a sort of "hourglass" means a device that measures the use, calculated in this case with the fenjan which is the unit of measure current locale. In 1971 each fenjan Water cost fifty rials ($ 0.0125, the exchange rate in 1997), which were used to pay for maintenance and distribution. The same price was charged in another village in 1976, while farmers in the villages around Yazd in 1978 a joareh of water costs one thousand rials, and the total amount paid by holders of the right to a share in the distribution of up to two million six hundred thousand rials (six hundred and fifty U.S. dollars) (Safinejad, 1996).
As described above, in the early stages of developing a community tasks for water supply are regulated according to existing rules and practice. Finally, when you form an organization mercantile transactions vengono dapprima regolate in natura ed infine in denaro, dopo che la comunità ha raggiunto le fasi finali del proprio percorso di sviluppo.
Ai giorni d'oggi nelle comunità rurali dell'Iran la valutazione in denaro dell'acqua è talmente comune che l'ufficio statistiche del Ministero dell'Agricoltura può facilmente raccogliere informazioni sul prezzo dell'acqua nelle varie parti del paese. Queste informazioni vengono utilizzate per calcolare il costo medio di ogni produzione agricola e suggerire al governo quale debba essere il prezzo garantito per il grano e per gli altri tipi di coltivazione che si voglia incentivare.
Allo stesso modo l'economia privata è piuttosto attiva per quanto riguarda l'estrazione dell'acqua dalle riserve groundwater. To date, the wells are replacing the qanat because they require less money and less time for construction. But this meant that they were made too many and that this would lead to over-exploitation. Many aquifers are being depleted and the drilling of additional wells is prohibited.
The Act authorizes the proper distribution of water Ministry of Energy to act as a check on sampling from underground reservoirs. This monitoring may result in a fee calculated as a percentage of the price of land (Table 2). The fee varies from region to region and is collected in cash. This procedure increasingly validates our hypothesis that the formation of a real market for water goes hand in hand with economic development. At first the value of it as a term is calculated using the most common food product or the water itself because these goods to trade more than others can make quick transactions. Finally, given the growing importance of trade in general economic conditions, counts are taken in terms of money. At least in Iran, the market seems to have developed their own water according to this line.
Table 2. Percentage of prices on any crop that authorizes the Energy Ministry to hold for the costs of supervision over water
Grano 0,25
Riso 0,6
Arance, datteri, verdure 0,85
Pistacchi e mandorle 1,0
Alberi da frutto 0,8
Altre 0,5
Fonte: Ministero dell'Energia, ufficio per le acque.
Conclusioni Nonostante il fatto che l'acqua rappresenti un bene sacro nella cultura islamica e che le sue fonti naturali siano per la legge islamica di proprietà comune, il mercato ha svolto comunque un importante ruolo nel controllo della domanda e dell'offerta di acqua, fin dai tempi del sorgere dello stato islamico in Arabia.
Giurisprudenza e legislazione sul property right in Islam to allow those who support efforts and costs to draw water from common property to enjoy the rights of property on the water thus obtained, provided that this does not conflict with the rights of other users. Such recognition allows you to exchange water with other goods: it allows to form a water market, characterized by a multiplicity of organizational forms observed in all Muslim countries.
In the first Islamic state, however, the construction of dams and creating reservoirs were financed by baitulmal . Both institutions, the private and public, have initiated and directed the activities necessary for the accumulation, the transfer and distribution of water.
Public goods tend to become a monopoly if the supply and distribution of the service are both assigned to the market. Neither the Islamic jurisprudence or the logic of the economy justify the privatization of the whole water sector. On the contrary, it is recommended that there is coordination between the public and private sectors in the control of activities that have to do with water. The public sector should bear the costs of living necessary for the research and the accumulation of water resources, the private sector should consider the transfer and distribution. It may involve the establishment of an efficient pricing system, If the Islamic laws and values \u200b\u200bwill affirm the markets. The price so determined could serve as a tariff for water supplied and sold dl public sector, covering all operating costs. In current practice should not be introduced any discrimination in the pricing of water. This proposal is consistent with Islamic law and jurisprudence, and with the way in which demand and supply of water occur in Iran.
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gazzettiero The mainstream of dusts off March 9, 2011, in the absence of anything better, the theme dell'erigenda mosque. Which we believe is not even matter because it must be built from newspapers and nothing else. 
